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Abstract
Information transfer and display issues associated with
the dissemination of hazardous weather warnings are studied in
the context of windshear alerts. Operational and developmental
windshear detection systems axe briefly reviewed. The July 11,
1988 microburst events observed as part of the Denver TDWR
operational evaluation are analyzed in terms of information
transfer and the effectiveness of the microburst alerts.
Information transfer, message content and display issues
associated with microburst alerts generated from ground based
sources (Doppler Radars, LLWAS and PIREPS) ars evaluated
by means of pilot opinion surveys and part task simulator
studies.
1. Introduction
Technological advances in ground-to-cockpit datalink
capability, information display, and hazardous weather detection
create the possibility for new and improved methods of informing
flight crews about weather hazards. However, the availability of
increased information, and multiple modes of communication also
lead to problems of system integration. Issues including the
selection, transfer, and presentation of information must be
addressed in the development of advanced systems for the
display of hazardous weather information. In addition, design
procedures, centered around the needs of the flight crew and the
capabilities of the available equipment should be applied.
The display and information transfer issues related to
advanced windshear alerting systems in the terminal area have
been chosen as an initial point of focus. This problem was
chosen both to investigate general issues related to the
dissemination of hazardous weather information and to focus on
specific issues of a critical near term need. Windshear in the
terminal area is one of the most dangerous weather-related
problems faced by aviation today.[ 1]. The real-time detection of
windshear hazards is a very active field of research,J2,3,4] and
thus provides a useful testing ground for issues related to
advanced data uplink and display of hazardous weather
information.
2. Background
2.1 Terminal Area Windshear
Low-altitude windshear is the leading weather-related
cause of fatal aviation accidents in the U.S. Since 1964, there
have been 26 accidents attributed to windshear resulting in over
500 fatalities [1,5]. Low-altitude windshear can take several
forms. Macroscopic forms, such as gustfronts caused by
colliding warm and cold air masses, can generally be predicted
and avoided. However, the small intense downdrafts known as
microbursts are far more dangerous and difficult to detect.
Microbursts begin with a cool downdraft formed at the base of a
cumulus or cumulonimbus: cloud. If the downdraft is strong
enough to impact the surface, it spreads out radially and creates
a small area (1 to 4 km in diameter) of intense windshear. Such
conditions typically last for short periods (10-30 rain), but can be
very dangerous to aircraft at low altitudes, particularly on takeoff
or final approach Initially, the aircraft experiences a strong
headwind, which causes a momentary increase in lift. Next, the
aircraft enters an area of downdraft, and then a sharp tailwind.
This combination results in loss of effective airspeed and
corresponding loss of lift. (Fig. 1). It may also serve to
destablilize the flight trajectory. The resulting performance loss
can in some cases be sufficient to result in ground impact. In
addition, microbutsts can be accompanied by strong edge
vortices, which can further destabilize the aircraft. Most fatal
windshear accidents have been attributed to microbursts.[5]
An additional factor which makes microbursts particularly
dangerous is that they are generally not obvious either visually or
to standard airborne weather radar. Microbursts have been
observed to occur both during periods of severe rain or during
periods of little or no low-altitude precipitation. For
meteorological and instrumentation purposes, it is convenient to
distinguish between 'wet' and 'dry' microhursts. Dry
rnicrobursts, more common in the western U.S., can sometimes
be detected by the presence of curling clouds of dust on the
ground or vertical cloud shafts known as 'virga'. Wet
microbursts cannot generally be distiguished from benign rain
ceils with radar reflectivity information.
Microbursts have been observed with intensities greater
than most aircraft could be reasonably expected to survive.
Avoidance is the best way to handle a windshear hazard. This
indicates a need for reliable remote detection, allowing the flight
crew adequate advance warning to plan and execute a maneuver
to avoid microburst penetration.
Fig. 1: Microburst windshear encounter on approach
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2.2 Microburst Detection
2.2.1 Current Procedures
Current procedures for microburst detection and warning
center around the Low-Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS),
Pilot reports, and improved pilot education through efforts such
as the FAA's Windshear Training Aid.J6] LLWAS is a system
of anemometers currently in service at most major U.S. airports
designed to measure shifts in wind speed and direction within the
airport perimeter. Although capable of detecting macroscopic
phenomena such as gustfronts, the anemometer spacing is larger
than the characteristic surface idimension of many rmcrobursts, and
thus LLWAS remains fairly ineffective for detection of
microburst windshear. The Windshear Training Aid states that
"If an LLWAS alert (triggered by wind speed and/or direction
differential) occurs, it indicates the presence of something shear-
like, though not necessarily indicative of magnitude or location.
However, the absence of an alert does not necessarily indicate
that it is safe to proceed! ".[6]
Pilot reports (PIREPS) of windshear provide the most
reliable data. The availability of PIREPS necessarily requires that
an aircraft penetrate a microburst, which is not desirable; but the
information, unlike LLWAS, provides conclusive evidence of a
windshear hazard for subsequent aircraft. It is desirable to
integrate PIREPS with any sensor data available in future
windshear detection systems.
The Windshear Training Aid itself is designed to inform
pilots and controllers about windshear, primarily how to
recognize and avoid or recover from microburst encounters.
Avoidance is practiced through the use of LLWAS information,
weather reports, and visual clues. In past accidents, these clues
have been largely ignored; increased windshear training emphasis
is being used to increase pilot awareness of these events,
However, high pilot workload in the terminal area and the relative
rarity of hazardous windshear makes it difficult for crews to fully
assimilate the evidence of windshear before penetration.
2.2.2 Emerging Windshear Detection
Technologies
To meet the need for improved windshear warning, new
systems for detection are under development. Both airborne and
ground-based systems are under consideration. Airborne look-
ahead systems are still primarily experimental: candidate
technologies include doppler radar, doppler lidar, and infrared
radiometry. [2,3,4] To be an effective, dependable windshear
avoidance tool, an airborne system must be able to detect
windshear ahead of the aircraft to a range of 1 - 3 km, thus
typically providing 15 to 45 seconds of warning. Also, the
sensor should work for either wet or dry microbursts with
enough resolution to adequately measure size and intensity.
None of the methods mentioned have yet fully demonstrated
these capabilities in flight.
Ground-based remote sensing technology is much more
developed. LLWAS and PIREPS often yield useful data, but are
not always available or accurate. Ground-based doppler radars
have been succesfully demonstrated for microburst detection
(JAWS, Huntsville, Denver) [5] and have an advantage over
airborne systems in terms of ground clutter suppression, size and
power. Experiments performed at Huntsville, AL in 1986 and at
Denver in 1987 and 1988 have shown impressive results (Table
1). The predominance of wet microbursts at Huntsville and dry
microbursts in Denver shows the versatility of the ground-based
doppler radar. The ability of such systems to integrate data aloft
with wind measurements near the surface allows for earlier
forecasting Of microburst locadofi s and outflow strengths.
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Table l:Doppler radar windshear detection results [7]
The demonstrated capability of ground-based doppler
radar for windshear detection and forecasting makes it the most
viable system for near term use for microburst avoidance
information. The combination of doppler radar, improved
LLWAS systems and PIREPS makes an integrated ground-based
system the primary focus for system integration and automated
datalink issues.
2,3 Ground-to-Air Data Transfer
Digital ground-to-air data transfer is an area under active
development. Several methods of digital ground-to-air data
transmission are currently or nearly available. ACARS, a
privately-sponsored system for the uplink and downlink of digital
information related to commercial aviation, is currently in use by
many major airlines. It provides a high-speed alphanumeric
datalink for flight management information, helping to relieve
congestion on crowded ATC voice frequencies. With the
addition of satellite relays, ACARS coverage will extend to most
international commercial air routes. The first satellite
transmissions are expected to begin in the third quarter of 1989 in
the Pacific Ocean region [8].
Another system slated for near-term deployment is the
FAA's Mode-S surveillance datalinlc Mode-S is an extension of
the altitude encoding Mode-C transponder in the ATC Radar
Beacon System allowing message delivery from ATC to
individual aircraft. Each individual message can carry 48 useful
bits of information, and the time for the interrogation beam to
scan the entire coverage area is 4 to 12 seconds. Messages can
be also be linked in groups of up to 4 frames or sent as a longer
Extended Length Message with less urgency.
In the long term, the Aviation Satellite Communications
System (SatCom) is being developed. The goal is a standardized
worldwide system for digital voice and data communications,
based on nine existing satellites in geosynchronous orbit.[9]
Other systems such as digital ATIS or enroute weather channels
are also envisioned for future development.
2.4 Information Transfer Issues in the 1988 Denver
TDWR Evaluation
An event which illustrates many of the information
transfer issues occurred during the 1988 Terminal Doppler
Weather Radar fTDWR) operational demonstration at Stapelton
International Airport in Denver. On July 11, a period of severe
microburst activity occurred. It is instructive to evaluate the
warnings and responses of the five aircraft which initiated and
abandoned approaches immediately prior to the closure of the
airport.
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2.4.1 TDWR Setup
In the 1988 operational evaluation, the TDWR radar was
operated by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory and located at the
Buckley AFB southeast of the Stapelton airport. Microburst and
gustfront alerts were generated from the doppler weather radar
data by an automatic algorithim and confu'med on line by an
NCAR meterologist. The alerts were then sent by ground line to
the Stapelton control tower and the terminal radar approach
control (TRACON).
The information was displayed in two formats in the
control tower. The local tower controller, who had primary
responsibility for the dissemination of microburst alerts, had an
alphanumeric display (Fig. 2) which could present either TDWR
or LLWAS information in the same format. This was done to
minimize the transition between periods of TDWR and LLWAS-
only operation. The tower supervisor and the TRACON also had
the geographical situation display which is shown in Fig.3. This
color display presented the locations of microbursts, gustfronts
and precipitation on a plan view of the runway configuration. In
addition, LLWAS wind vectors are displayed. In the tower a
local controller working arrivals to Runways 26L and 26R would
have to cross the tower cab to have access to the geographical
situation display.
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Fig. 3: Geographical situation display used in the
control tower and TRACON (from Ref. 7).
2.4.2 July 11, 1988 Scenario
The period of intense microburst activity began at the
Stapelton airport shortly after 2200 UTC. At this time arriving
aircraft were landing on runways 26L and 26R. Departing
aircraft were using runways 35L and 35R. On the arrival ATIS
aircraft were informed of a convective SIGMET for the eastern
Colorado area,and that the doppler radar windshear detection
demonstration was in progress. After 2203 UTC the ATIS was
updated to include "low level windshear advisories in effect".
The evolution of the microburst event can be seen in the
geographical situation displays presented to the tower supervisor
at at 2201, 2207 and 2212 UTC (Fig.4). At 2201 UTC there
/. * //
_ J
_._.._, ..I 1_ _
Time 22:12
Fig. 4: Geographical situation display plots
showing the evolution of the severe
microburst event of July 11.
ORIGINP, L p,_._ I8
OF POOR QUALITY
71
was an area of precipitation southwest of the airport and a region
of 25 kt windshear within 2 miles of the airport center. By 2207
UTC. a gustfront had developed over the airport with some light
precipitation. Several microbursts had developed with the
gustfront including a 45 kt headwind to tailwind cell located on
the approach to runways 26L and 26R. By 2212 UTC the
microburst had increased in strength to 80 kts and the
precipitation had increased. This microburst event continued at
high intensity to 2222 UTC when it began to abate. Windshear
values of 30 kts were still being measured at 2230.
The altitude versus time plots generated from Mode C
transponder replies for the 5 aircraft which initiated approaches
between 2207 and 2214 UTC are shown in Fig. 5. Also shown
are the times at which microburst alerts were given to the aircraft
and the time of reported missed approach. All aircraft which
penetrated the microburst re.ported intense windshear.
Transcripts of the verbal microburst alerts given to each aircraft
by the local tower controller are presented in Table 2. It is
unknown if there were any microburst alerts issued to these
aircraft by the TRACON approach controller. However, the fact
that 4 of the 5 aircraft elected to continue the approach indicates
that this was unlikely.
2.4.3 Implications of the July 11 Experience
Several issues important to the development of microburst
alerting systems are apparent from this data. The variability in
aircrew interpretation of microburst warnings can be seen by
comparing the response of aircraft A to that of aircraft B. The
aircraft were approaching parallel runways and were issued
virtually identical alerts within 30 seconds of each other. Aircraft
A elected to immediately abandon the approach based on the
microburst alert and visual observations of a descending rain
shaft. This aircraft never penetrated the primary microburst area.
Aircraft B elected to continue the approach, penetrated the
microburst, and descended to within 100 ft of the runway
threshold before executing a missed approach.
Another issue which arises from the data is the delay
between the generation and the voice transmission of the alert to
the aircraft by ATC. Fig.6 plots the delay to alert for each aircraft
based on the fLrst TDWR generated microburst alert at 22:06:17
UTC and the assumption that no alerts were given to these
aircraft by the TRACON. It can be seen that the shortest delay
was approximately 60 seconds and that a delay of 350 seconds
was encountered for the last aircraft to report to the tower
(Aircraft E). The delays in excess of I00 seconds are likely a
result of the effort to make the TDWR alerts apear like LLWAS
alerts. The primary windshear alert responsibility therefore
rested with the tower controller who did not have contact with the
aircraft until they were at the outer marker. It does appear,
however, that a minimum delay of approximately 60 seconds can
be expected for the dissemination of verbal alerts even if the
aircraft is in contact with the controller who has alerting
responsibility.
A third issue which arises is that the initial microburst
alert for each aircraft was imbedded within a routine landing
clearance message. The routineness of the message may have
resulted in a lack of urgency associated with the alert. This
possible lack of urgency coupled with the high cockpit workload
which occurs at the outer marker may have contributed to the
difficulty some crews had in fully assessing the magnitude of the
hazard. It is also worth noting that the tower controller relied
primarily on the alphanumeric display. It is interesting to
consider whether his level of urgency may have increased if he
had access to the geographical situation display and could have
more easily visualized how the situation was developing.
The final point which comes out of the analysis is the
importance of PIREPS. Both the flight crews and the tower
controller were more likely to react conservatively to the
microburst alert after several aircraft had gone around and
Fig.
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22:07:15
22:07:35
22:09:35
22:11:05
22:11:45
22:12:05
Aircraft A
"A_rm'_tA, D_mver tower,nmway two sixtight,clearedto
land._croburn Lie_ cenu:rfieldwind two two _ atnone,
a fortyknot |o,i,<me mile finalas reportedby machine,no
pilotreTo_."
Aircraft B
"Aircraft B, Denver tower, runway two six left cleared to
land. Win ,4- two one zero at five, a forty knot lo_s, one mile
final microbmst alert,not substantiatedby aircraft."
Aircraft C
"Aircraft C heavy, Denver tower, microbunt alert, threshold
wind orte four zero at five, expect a fifty knot loss, two mile
fimil, nmway two six left, cleared to land."
Aircraft D
"Aircraft D, caution have tutholmce from the heavy DC-8.
He is goingaroLmd. We have a microhorn alert, threshold
winds, zero nine zero at Lhrcc. Expect a seventy knot l_s on
a three mile final."
"Micrt_urn ale_ runway two six. Threshed wind, one five
zero at five, expect an eighty knot Ires on a three mile f'mal."
Aircraft E
"Aircraft E, rnicroburn ale_, thleshcld wind one six zero st
six, expect an eighty knot loss on a three mile t-real, say
_que_"
Table 2: Transcripts of verbal microburst alerts
issued to each aircraft.
reported wind shear. This, coupled with the increasing
microburst intensity, explains why the later aircraft initiated their
missed approaches at higher altitudes than aircraft B which had
no PIREP information to confu'm the microburst alert.
3. Research on Windshear Detection and Warning in
the Advanced ATC Environment
3.1 Problem Statement
The integration of ground-based information sources with
digital datalinks such as MOde-S shows great potential for the
accurate prediction and delivery of microburst windshear alerts
with minimal delay. Fig. 7 illustrates possible information flow
configurations for such a system. The multiple potential data
paths are dependent on the acceptable degree of automation.
Clearly, the delay between detection and alert is minimized with a
fully automated process whereby computer algorithms determine
alerts from PIREPS, TDWR, and LLWAS data and use MOde-S
to directly distribute them. However, putting the controller in the
loop to some degree would help filter false alarms and more
efficiently control the destination of the data.
I . Voice _ Y,'_'_'\ /_ 7_,
.__J Ground Data _ T-
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Fig 7: Possible windshear data distribution in the
advanced ATC environment.
A number of other information issues also require
consideration. The content, timing, transmission, and
presentation of windshear information all need to be determined.
Automated links such as Mode-S are subject to bit limitations and
reliability considerations. This has an impact on message content
and distribution. The timing and priority of alerts must be
considered to get maximum efficiency and to generate the least
possible confusion. The high workload of both controllers and
flight crews during terminal area operations adds a further
measure of difficulty. Finally, the varying levels of instrument
sophistication in civil aircraft must be considered. The advanced
moving map displays in modern transport category aircraft allow
for development of user-oriented graphical presentations, while
many general aviation aircraft have no visual display capability.
3.2 Investigations
Several investigations are being performed to address the
issues discussed above. Flight crew opinion surveys are being
used to obtain user input on a number of factors. Data is sought
on current operational issues such as LLWAS and other available
windshear information sources, as well as pilot perceptions of the
microburst threat. Also, issues of data transmission and
presentation are addressed. In addition, some issues are being
addressed through flight simulation studies. A simple experiment
based on a general aviation simulator was conducted to compare
voice communication with graphical data presentation modes.
Also, a part-task simulation of the Boeing 757/767 has been
developed in order to do more sophisticated investigation into
optimization of graphical warning formats, information content
and delivery timing, and the effect on pilot workload.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Current Windshear Procedures
For user input on current windshear alert systems and
requirements for future systems, a pilot opinion survey is being
conducted. A preliminary sample of 20 United Airlines line and
training PilOtS has been completed, and a further distribution of
250 is under way. Initial results show several consistent trends.
It is almost um_,,ersally agreed (94%) that microbursts pose a
major safety hazard to transport aircraft. Fifty-three percent of
the respondents have had what they considered to be a hazardous
windshear encounter, most incidents occurred at DEN, a United
operations hub. When posed the question "Currently available
windshear alert data is sufficient for safe operation in the terminal
area," only 17% of the respondents agreed, while 56%
disagreed. All but one of the pilots felt that "...a system to
provide airerews with better and more timely windshear alerts is
_." The results clearly indicate that flight crews are not
completely confident in currendy available data and would be
very receptive to improvements. Figure 8 shows the pilots'
average ranking of possible sources of windshear information.
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sources.
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Significantly,PIREPSandvisualcluesareboth
consideredmoreusefulfor windshear avoidance than LLWAS
alerts. Yet, neither pilot reports or visual clues are always
available; this underlines the need for a detection system which
can reliably provide some degree of advance warning.
3.3.2 Modes of Information Presentation
Because of the high workload in terminal area operatibns,
it is important to consider the manner in which information is _"
presented to the flight crew. This was illustrated by the Stapleton
incident; even though data was available, it was difficult to
effectively communicate it to the flight crew. There are several
possible modes of information presentation in the cockpit: voice,
alphanumeric, or graphical. Issues to be considered include
crew workload, preferences, and the capabilities of the aircraft
instrumentation. The widespread use of CRT displays in modern
transport aircraft, for example, opens up new possibilities for
totally automated graphical information displays. Moving map
displays, such as the Electronic Flight Instrumentation System
(EFIS) used on the Boeing 757-767 generation of aircraft, are
good candidates for display of critical weather information.
Responses from the pilot survey indicate that pilots are
receptive to graphic displays. (Fig. 9). The specific suggestion
of integrating windshear information with an EFIS-type moving
map display was strongly supported. Also of interest was the
preference of ATC voice alerts over alphanumeric links or ATIS
information. Comments received indicated that the low ranking
of ATIS was due to the time between updates.
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Fig. 9: Pilot rankings of possible relay/presentation
modes of windshear information from the
ground
A preliminary exlmdment has been conducted with a
general aviation simulator to compare the efficiency of voice and
graphical modes of presentation. Eight GA pilots with 210 to
1,700 total flight hours were tested. The scenario involved a
microburst which appeared during an ILS approach, when the
aircraft reached the outer marker. Avoidance of the microburst
required a non-standard missed approach. The information was
presented by voice, on a runway-fixed graphic display of
microburst position, and on a graphic display showing both the
microburst and aircraft positions. The data (Table 3) shows the
effectiveness of the graphic displays. Avoidance improved
significantly with the graphic displays, even though the same
information was presented at the same time in each case.
7t,
Presentation Type Avoidance Rate
Voice (IAWS format) 43%
Runway-Fixed Graphical Display:
Microburst position only 62%
Runway-Fixed Graphical Display:
Microburst + Aircraft position 94%
Table 3: Results of experiment with general aviation
simulator and computer graphic display.
These results considered, the incident at Stapleton Airport
serves as an illustration of the problems of voice communication.
Crew and ATC workload in terminal phases of flight is high,
leading to possible confusion and error. The simulation indicates
that even under fairly light workload, the difficulty involved in
fully interpreting the microburst threat from a voice warning can
mean the difference between avoidance and penetration. Further
evaluation of communication modes, including a variety of
alphanumeric and graphic formats, will be perf_ with the
part-task 757/767 simulator.
3.3.3 Message content and timing
The issue of what data is necessary and when it should be
presented is important for either voice or digital transmission. In
either case, a limited amount of information can be contained, and
the timing must be determined to give the crew maximum
awareness while minimizing the increase in workload. An initial
viewpoint can be obtained from the pilot surveys. The responses
indicate that location and intensity of microbursts are clearly the
most important information items. Size, microburst movement,
and intensity trends are of secondary importance, and shape data
is generally felt to be inconsequential.
Location
Intensity
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Fig. 10: Pilot ranking of microburst information by
importance
The issues of what constitutes a hazardous microburst,
who should be informed, and when are more difficult to resolve.
The surveys are less clear in this case; the most common
response was that aircraft should be alerted as soon as
microbursts are detected anywhere around the airport vicinity. A
few pilots defined a particular phase of flight, i.e. at the outer
marker, when cleared for approach, or immediately upon entering
the terminal area, as the best point for deliveay of mieroburst
alerts.
In response to a question about threshold shear levels,
there was general agreement that a windshear adviso_ should be
issued for approximately 10 knots of head-to-tail shear and a
www_g___for 15 knots of shear. Also, it was almost unanimously
expressed that decisions about the threat posed by windshear in a
particular situation should be made entirely by the pilot, and the
controller's role should be to maintain safe separation during
avoidancemaneuvers. However, it remains to be determined
what locations and intensities of microbursts actually constitute a
threat in the view of the pilot. It is impractical to plan on
distribution of all available windshear information in raw form to
all aircraft in a congested terminal area. Some 'threshold hazard
level' needs to be defined, based not only on the windshear
intensity of the microburst, but including other factors such as the
microburst and aircraft locations, aircraft altitude, and desired
flight path. '.
3.4 Current Research
Research to resolve these issues is being conducted with
the part-task 757/767 simulation shown in Fig. 11. The
simulation uses an IRIS 240(0 graphics computer, an autopilot
control panel, and an EFIS control panel to duplicate the
electronic instrumentation and flight dynamics of the aircraft.
Data from TDWR experiments is used to generate simulated
airborne weather radar returns and the windfield over the airport.
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Figure 11: Part-Task 757/767 EFIS Simulation
The initial simulations are based on data provided by
NCAR and the Lincoln Laboratory TDWR evaluations. The
Sthpleton incident is very well documented, and serves as a
model for scenario construction. With a suitable sidetask,
workload levels will be properly adjusted to get a reasonable
range of pilot responses. Once the simulation is validated and a
range of scenarios developed, issues of information format can
be explored. Simulations of MOde-S transmissions with varying
alphanumeric and graphic alert formats can be added, as well as
voice communications, and the differences in pilot decision
making and reaction time can be measured. If the results are
commensurate with the results of the earlier general aviation
simulations, more specific tests can be performed. These will
center around more specific information issues, such as warning
content, timing, and display formats.
4. Conclusions
Based on the above, the following points can be made:
• Technological advances in weather sensors and information
transfer will allow development of sophisticated hazardous
weather detection and alert systems. Design guidelines, centered
around the end user and the available equipment, need to be
applied to these systems.
• Microburst windshear is a.. weather hazard of particular
concern and hence provides a good test case for development of
user-oriented weather alert displays. Pilot surveys indicate that
currently available detection and alert systems are not adequate,
and a system for advance detection and alert is needed.
• The events which occurred during the TDWR operational
evaluation on July 11, 1988 were analyzed in the context of
information transfer issues. The observations included the
following: Variability of pilot response to similar rnicroburst
alerts. The verbal relay of microburst alerts was found to induce
delays. The inclusion of microburst alerts with other routine
messages was thought to reduce the sense of urgency of the
alerts. Finally, PIREPS have been found to be extremely
important in vatida_ng the TDWR alerts to the user.
• A review of the current state of microburst detection
technology and the analysis of the TDWR operational evaluation
leads to the conclusion that the integration of ground-based
doppler radar, LLWAS and PIREPS, and of a digital datalink
such as MOde-S is the most viable near-term system for reliable
advance warning of windshear.
• A simple flight simulator study has indicated that display of
windshear information with a graphical display of aircraft and
microburst position can result in significantly greater microburst
awareness and greatly improve the probability of avoidance when
compared with standard voice transmission.
• An opinion survey of air carrier pilots was conducted.
Pilots feel that PIREPS and visual clues are the best currendy
available methods for microburst detection, while LLWAS and
airborne weather radar are less effective. Also, pilots were
receptive to the idea of displaying windshear information on an
EFIS display, preferring the EFIS to ATC voice
communications. Alphanumeric information and ATIS were
rated poorly for transmission of windshear alerts.
• When asked about microburst alert information content,
pilot specified that microburst location and intensity were the
most important items, followed by size, movement, and intensity
trend information.
• Research is currently in progress to further explore the
issues involved. A part-task Boeing 757/767 simulation has been
developed to address issues of warning content, timing, and a
selection of alphanumeric and graphical display formats.
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